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Visual working memory (WM) capacity is thought to be limited to three or four items.
However, many cognitive activities seem to require larger temporary memory stores.
Here, we provide evidence for a temporary memory store with much larger capacity
than past WM capacity estimates. Further, based on previous WM research, we show
that a single factor — proactive interference — is sufficient to bring capacity estimates
down to the range of previous WM capacity estimates. Participants saw a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) of 5 to 21 pictures of familiar objects or words presented
at rates of 4/s or 8/s, respectively, and thus too fast for strategies such as rehearsal.
Recognition memory was tested with a single probe item. When new items were used
on all trials, no fixed memory capacities were observed, with estimates of up to 9.1
retained pictures for 21-item lists, and up to 30.0 retained pictures for 100-item lists,
and no clear upper bound to how many items could be retained. Further, memory
items were not stored in a temporally stable form of memory, but decayed almost
completely after a few minutes. In contrast, when, as in most WM experiments, a
small set of items was reused across all trials, thus creating proactive interference
among items, capacity remained in the range reported in previous WM experiments.
These results show that humans have a large-capacity temporary memory store in
the absence of proactive interference, and raise the question of whether temporary
memory in everyday cognitive processing is severely limited as in WM experiments,
or has the much larger capacity found in the present experiments.
Introduction
Working memory (WM), that is, the ability to keep
relevant information in mind over short periods of time
while performing cognitive manipulations, is crucial to
virtually all cognitive activities. Measures of WM cor-
relate with many important measures of intelligence,
language comprehension, reasoning, and educational
achievement (e.g., Barrouillet, 1996; Daneman & Car-
penter, 1980; Daneman & Green, 1986; Engle, Tuholski,
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Engle, Carullo, & Collins,
1991; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Fukuda, Vogel,
This research was supported by NIH grant MH47432 and
Marie Curie Incoming Fellowship 303163-COMINTENT.
Further, we acknowledge support by grants CONSOLIDER-
INGENIO-CDS-2007-00012 and PSI2012-3253 from the
Spanish Ministerio de Economı´a y Competitividad and SGR-
2009-1521 from the Catalan government. We are grateful to
T. Brady, N. Cowan, N. Kanwisher, A´. Kova´cs, A. Oliva,
E. Vogel and B. Wyble for helpful comments on an earlier
version of this manuscript. We also thank Brady, Konkle,
Alvarez, and Oliva (2008) for making their stimuli available.
Mayr, & Awh, 2010; King & Just, 1991; Kyllonen &
Christal, 1990), suggesting that WM is an important
determinant of our cognitive abilities.
A wealth of experiments has revealed that there are
stringent constraints on WM, such that people can re-
member only up to four items simultaneously (for re-
views, see e.g. Conway et al., 2005; Cowan, 1995, 2001,
2005). Such WM limitations are observed not only in
laboratory tasks, but also in everyday life. For exam-
ple, when trying to remember a telephone number, we
are keenly aware that WM capacity is not as large as
we might wish it to be. These limitations contribute
to the difficulty of doing mental arithmetic (e.g., Hitch,
1978), and might plausibly be one of the root causes of
the difficulty of many other cognitive activities such as
manipulating algebraic expressions or reasoning about
abstract problems.
In other situations, however, there do not appear to
be such stringent limitations on what we can temporar-
ily remember. For example, when driving, we can oper-
ate the vehicle and monitor the traffic while keeping in
mind where we want to go, that we have to go to a gas
station, that we have to pick up some food on the way,
all while keeping in mind speed limits, while following a
conversation, interrupting the conversation to listen to
the weather forecast, resuming the conversation, and so
on. In such situations, cognitive operations seem to be
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supported by a temporary memory store that does not
rely on active maintenance and has a much larger capac-
ity than three or four items. In line with this view, when
objects are embedded in meaningful scenes and when
observers can at least partially rely on LTM, previous
research has shown that memory capacity for objects
is much larger than in typical WM experiments (e.g.,
Hollingworth, 2004, 2005; Hollingworth & Henderson,
2002).
While there have been important debates on the ques-
tion of whether a WM capacity of 3 or 4 items is an
overestimate, or whether people can really retain only
a single item (e.g., Oberauer, 2002; Oztekin, Davachi,
& McElree, 2010), here we ask whether people are
equipped with a temporary memory mechanism with
a much larger capacity, an ability that seems crucial for
many practical purposes in everyday cognition. Further,
we investigate the robustness of this memory store in the
face of a factor that might play an important role in WM
as well: proactive interference from previous trials.
Proactive interference in
working memory
Proactive interference seems to be a prevalent fea-
ture of past WM experiments, to the extent that some
authors have specifically argued that a crucial function
of WM is to counteract the effects of such interference
(Engle, 2002). This can be illustrated by one of the
dominant paradigms used for investigating WMmemory
limitations: the change-detection paradigm pioneered
by Luck and Vogel (1997). In such experiments, par-
ticipants see an array of items (e.g., colored geometric
figures), and have to detect whether a second array con-
tains a changed item.
In these and other experiments, investigators at-
tempted to rule out contributions of long-term memory
(LTM) by using relatively small sets of materials and
reusing the same items in many trials. This, in turn,
forces participants to distinguish memory for the current
trial from that of previous trials. For example, in Luck
and Vogel’s (1997) Experiment 1, stimuli were drawn
from just seven different colors; these stimuli were then
reused throughout the experiment. Therefore, to avoid
contamination from previous trials, participants must
try to remember that a given test item was presented
in the current trial rather than a prior trial. In other
words, reusing the same limited set of items and features
might lead to PI across trials.1
While such experimental paradigms seem to suggest
that PI might be important for establishing WM limi-
tations (Engle, 2002), the role of PI for WM is contro-
versial, with some authors proposing that PI has only
a limited effect on WM capacity estimates (Hartshorne,
2008; see also Lin & Luck, 2012; Makovski & Jiang,
2008). Those authors found little PI from items in im-
mediately preceding trials, and concluded that PI made
only a limited contribution to WM capacity limitations.
However, except in some of Hartshorne’s (2008) analy-
ses, those experiments reused small sets of items in many
trials, which might have resulted in a substantial level of
background PI. Hence, the experiments compared high
interference (from items in the immediately preceding
trial) to slightly lower interference (from items appear-
ing in earlier trials). In addition, in the studies cited,
capacity estimates were mathematically limited to 4 or
5, as only 4 or 5 items were presented. These other con-
straints on performance may have limited the observable
size of the interference effect.
While the studies just cited did not find effects of
proactive interference, there is a rich literature show-
ing that proactive interference does constrain how many
items can be retained. For example, Keppel and Un-
derwood (1962) studied the retention of consonant tri-
grams. They showed that, after a 3 s retention inter-
val, recall performance dropped from about 80% for the
first triplet to about 55% for the second one, with little
change afterwards. This drop in performance was pre-
sumably due to proactive interference from having re-
called a previous triplet (see also D. D. Wickens, Born,
& Allen, 1963).2,3
Most relevant to the current purposes, Cowan, John-
son, and Saults (2005) presented participants with lists
of words, followed by a recognition test. Each list com-
prised 3, 4, 6 or 8 words, and items were presented for
1.5 s each. Crucially, there were 12 blocks of 12 tri-
als. The first four blocks had words drawn from dif-
1 Reusing the same material across trials might be con-
sidered to lead to difficulties in recalling the items’ source;
however, it is unknown whether source memory (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000) and
the mechanisms counteracting PI are related.
2 Using complex span tasks, there is also evidence for a
correlation between susceptibility to PI and memory span.
For example, Rosen and Engle (1998) asked participants dif-
ferent in their memory span to learn three lists of word pairs.
In the low-interference condition, pairs in the three lists had
the form EF, DC, AB; in the high-interference condition, in
contrast, pairs in the three lists had the form AB, AC, AB.
Hence, there was overlap in the pairs in the high-interference
condition but not in the low-interference condition. Results
showed that high-span individuals were better than low-span
individuals in learning the second list in the high-interference
condition; further, they were also slower than low-span indi-
viduals on the third list, suggesting that participants might
have had to disengage processes combating proactive inter-
ference (see also Kane & Engle, 2000 for more evidence that
active processes are recruited to counteract proactive inter-
ference.)
3 Interestingly, susceptibility to PI also seems to be an im-
portant determinant of older adult’s impaired working mem-
ory. For example, Lustig, May, and Hasher (2001) showed
that the difference in reading span is much reduced between
older and younger adults when a method is employed that
reduced PI.
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ferent categories; the next 8 blocks had words drawn
from the same category, thereby producing PI. Cowan
et al. (2005) compared performance in the first 4 trials,
serving as a low-interference condition, to performance
in the last 4 trials, serving as a high-interference condi-
tion. They found that performance was markedly better
in the low-interference condition.
While these results show that PI has a marked effect
on working memory performance, they raise two critical
questions. First, if, as we will suggest below, temporary
memory capacity is large in the absence of PI, the lim-
ited set-sizes in Cowan et al.’s (2005) would not reveal
such large capacities; in the experiments below, we will
address this issue by using set-sizes of up to 100. Second,
Cowan et al. (2005) used relatively long presentation
durations of 1.5 s. This raises the question of whether
items were encoded in a temporary form of memory,
or rather in a stable form of memory such as long-term
memory. Further, this relatively long presentation dura-
tion might have allowed participants to rehearse items.
In fact, Keppel and Underwood (1962) showed that al-
lowing participants to rehearse items for just 2 s before
a retention interval had a protective effect on memory,
rising the question of what kind of memory storage was
utilized by Cowan et al.’s (2005) participants. We will
address this question in the experiments below as well.
The capacity of memory
To discuss the nature of memory limitations, it is
useful to briefly introduce common terms used to dis-
tinguish forms of memory: short-term memory (STM),
WM and LTM.4 While these labels are used slightly
differently by different scholars, with some controversy
about their definition, some scholars propose that the
difference between LTM and STM might be that “only
short-term memory [demonstrates] (1) temporal decay
and (2) chunk capacity limits,” while WM might com-
prise additional mechanisms that manipulate stored in-
formation (e.g., Cowan, 2008). Other researchers, how-
ever, question a distinction between STM and LTM
(e.g., Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Crowder, 1993;
Nairne, 2002; Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005; Wickel-
gren, 1973). Depending on the conditions of learning,
a given item will vary in initial strength, and forgetting
will vary correspondingly. Crucially, however, memory
will not be limited to any specific number of items. Ac-
cordingly, STM might in principle have a large capacity.
In fact, LTM has a virtually unbounded memory ca-
pacity. For example, Standing (1973) presented partic-
ipants with up to 10,000 pictures or words presented
for 5 seconds each, and tested for recognition two days
later. Recognition performance was excellent. Likewise,
Brady et al. (2008) showed that memory representations
for pictures are remarkably precise. After seeing 2,500
categorically unique objects for 3 s each, participants
did not only discriminate old objects from novel objects
from different categories, but also from objects in the
same category, or the same objects in a different state; in
each case, discrimination performance approached 90%.
Hence, LTM capacity is large. If STM is simply a“weak”
form of LTM that is readily forgotten, might it have a
larger but still temporary capacity when conditions of
acquisition are favorable?
Here, we are concerned with memory stores that tem-
porarily register items. We thus adopt a functional def-
inition of temporary memory: a set of mechanisms that
allows people to retain meaningful information over a
limited period of time. However, foreshadowing our re-
sults, our data are consistent with a unitary account
of STM, WM and LTM. Specifically, when items are
viewed briefly, the resulting memories are fleeting and
disappear over the course of a few minutes, functionally
acting as a short-term memory store with a large ca-
pacity. When proactive interference is added, one finds
the memory limitations of previous visual memory ex-
periments that have been considered limited by WM.
Finally, if items are viewed repeatedly or for longer pe-
riods of time, the memory representations become con-
solidated in LTM and are forgotten only slowly. That
said, in some cognitive situations (e.g., when perform-
ing mental operations on numbers such as comparing
them, adding them etc.), there appears to be an effortful
and severely constrained form of memory that shows the
limitations characteristic of previous WM experiments,
that relies on active manipulation of memory items, and
that might be limited to as little as a single item that can
be placed in the focus of attention (e.g., Oberauer, 2002;
Oztekin et al., 2010, but see e.g. Pylyshyn & Storm,
1988; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999 for evidence that this is
not the case for all forms of attention). The items in this
actively maintained system might constitute a separate
memory store. Importantly, however, unless items need
to be actively manipulated, temporary memory might
have a much larger capacity than previously thought.
The current experiments
We assess temporary memory capacity estimates for
meaningful everyday objects as well as words, asking
whether capacity is always as severely limited as WM
research would suggest. We use meaningful items be-
cause cognitive processes presumably operate on mean-
ingful items, and because memory capacity is known to
be poor for items that cannot be interpreted in terms of
meaningful categories (Olsson & Poom, 2005; see also
Feigenson & Halberda, 2008 for evidence that concep-
tual information enhances memory capacity even in in-
fancy). In the General Discussion, we will come back to
the issue of how the use of meaningful items might have
affected our results.
4 In addition to these forms of memory, iconic memory has
an extremely short duration but large capacity (Sperling,
1960); however, the retention intervals in the experiments
presented below are too long for iconic memory to play a
role.
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Our experiments employ a rapid serial visual presen-
tation (RSVP) procedure, where memory items are pre-
sented one at a time for presentation durations of the
order of a single eye fixation. This method is well suited
to investigate the temporary memory store proposed
above, for three reasons. First, the presentation time
for each item can be controlled and made brief enough
to avoid ceiling effects, while allowing participants to re-
trieve or construct abstract conceptual representations
of the items they see (Potter, Staub, & O’Connor, 2004),
rather than only lower-level features such as those stored
in iconic memory (Sperling, 1960). Encoding stimuli as
meaningful items is crucial for them to be useful in a
WM-like memory store, because, as mentioned above,
cognitive processes presumably operate on conceptual
representations as opposed to bundles of low-level fea-
tures.
Second, observers encode rapidly presented sequences
of pictures by non-verbal means. They cannot employ
verbal strategies such as rehearsing, because the presen-
tation rate is too high, and because pictures are pro-
cessed by a fully non-verbal route in such paradigms
(Endress & Potter, 2012).
Third, an RSVP procedure allows us to directly assess
the effects of PI. Specifically, participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions. In the unique con-
dition, all pictures were unique, and were encountered
only once in the experiment. In the repeated condition,
pictures were selected from a set of 22 pictures; partic-
ipants thus saw new combinations of the same pictures
repeatedly across trials. As a result, we would expect
substantial PI in the repeated condition, while PI in the
unique condition should be minimal.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we measured how many items could
be remembered when the items were unique and when
they were repeated, respectively, asking whether tempo-
rary memory storage would be larger than in the WM
literature at least when PI is minimized. In each trial,
participants saw a sequence of 7, 12 or 17 pictures of
familiar everyday objects, presented in sequence for 250
ms per picture, with no interval between pictures.
Participants were then shown a single test picture and
had to decide whether it had been presented in the se-
quence: on half the trials it had been. Crucially, par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions. In the unique condition, all pictures were unique,
and were encountered only once in the experiment. In
the repeated condition, pictures were selected from a set
of 22 pictures; participants thus saw the same pictures
repeatedly across trials, but without repeats within a
trial.
If we can store only a fixed number of items that
is below the number of items in the sequence, capac-
ity estimates should be constant in both conditions. In
contrast, if we have a relatively large temporary storage
capacity, capacity estimates should be much larger in
the unique condition, increasing when more items are
presented — because, without interference from previ-
ous trials, participants can remember more items when
more items are presented. If PI limits memory capac-
ity, capacity estimates should increase much less in the
repeated condition, staying in the range of previously
reported WM capacity estimates.
Materials and methods
Participants. Thirty-six participants (24 females,
means age 25.2) from the MIT community took part
in Experiment 1. They were randomly assigned to the
unique and the repeated condition.
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented on a NEC Multi-
Sync FE700+ 17” CRT (refresh rate: 75 Hz; resolution:
640 × 480), using the Matlab psychophysics toolbox
(Version 3.0.8; Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Responses
were collected from pre-marked “Yes” and “No” keys on
the keyboard.
Materials. Stimuli were color photographs of familiar
everyday objects taken from Brady et al. (2008). Stim-
uli were randomly selected for each participant from a
set of 2,400 pictures. They were presented subtending a
visual angle of 12.7 × 12.7 degrees.
Procedure. Participants completed 60 trials per set-
size. They started each trial by a key-press and then
viewed instructions to look at the pictures for 1000 ms,
followed by a fixation cross for 300 ms and a 200 ms
blank screen, followed by the sample pictures presented
at a duration of 250 ms per picture. Then, they saw a
question mark for 800 ms, followed by a blank screen for
900 ms and the test picture presented for 800 ms. “Old”
test items (those that occurred in the sample sequence)
were randomly sampled from two initial positions (serial
positions 2, 3), two final positions (antepenultimate and
penultimate) and two middle positions that depended
on the set-size (with the exception of set-size 7, where
we used only one serial position for medial and 2 serial
positions each for initial and final positions). Impor-
tantly, the very first and last pictures in the sequence
were never tested.
“New” test items, which were presented on 50% of the
trials, were entirely new items in the unique condition;
in the repeated condition, they were drawn randomly
from the set of 22 pictures, excluding those that had
been presented in that trial. Trials were presented in
random order, with the constraints that not more than
three trials could occur in a row that shared the set-
size, the correct response (yes/no) or the serial position
of “old” test pictures.
Before completing the main experiment, participants
were pre-familiarized with pictures. In the repeated con-
dition they were pre-familiarized with the 22 pictures
they would see during the main experiment. That is,
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the pictures were presented 10 times, with presentation
durations decreasing from 2000 to 250 ms. Participants
in the unique condition were also familiarized with 22
pictures in the same manner, but these pictures were
different from those used in the main experiment.
Analysis. We will report the results below using two
main measures: memory capacity estimates and the per-
centage of correct responses. As we will discuss below,
the percentage of correct responses is linearly related
to the probability of remembering an item; hence, the
analyses of the percentage of correct responses hold also
for probability of remembering.
WM capacity estimates are typically obtained using
the two-high-threshold formula K = N × (H − FA),
where K is the capacity, N the number of items, and
H and FA the hit rate and the false alarm rate, respec-
tively (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Rouder et al., 2008). This
formula assumes that observers report that they recog-
nize an item when the item’s familiarity crosses a certain
(memory) threshold, and that they have a second, low,
threshold below which they report that the items are
new; in between these two thresholds, observers guess
(see e.g. Cowan, 2001; Rouder et al., 2008 for discus-
sion). According to this formula, pretained = H − FA
is the probability that an item is retained in memory;
multiplying by the number of presented items gives the
estimated number of items in memory, K. In our case,
with an equal number of “old” and “new” test pictures,
pretained is simply pretained = 2 × pcor − 1, where pcor is
the proportion of correct responses (combining hits and
correct rejections). For each participant and set-size, we
computed capacity estimates separately.
We present the data in terms of capacity estimates
for comparison purposes with the previous literature.
However, the K measure only makes sense if indeed ob-
servers have a fixed capacity that, once it is reached,
prevents any further items from being encoded. As will
become clear, our data do not conform to this assump-
tion. Hence, we also analyze our results in terms of
the proportion of correct responses as a function of the
number of items presented. As mentioned above, these
analyses are equivalent to those using the proportion of
retained items as a dependent measure.
Results
Capacity estimates. Figure 1(A) shows the results of
Experiment 1 in terms of capacity estimates. In the
unique condition, capacity estimates increased from 3.8
to 8.0 between set-sizes 7 and 17. In contrast, in the
repeated condition, capacity estimates were relatively
constant, increasing from 2.7 to 4.4 between set-sizes
7 and 17. An ANOVA with set-size as within-subject
factor and condition as between-subjects factor yielded
main effects of condition, F (1,34) = 11.45, p = .002,
η2
p
= .252, as well as of set-size, F (2,68) = 32.02, p <
.0001, η2
p
= .449. Critically, an interaction, F (2,68) =
5.35, p = .007, η2
p
= .075, indicated that capacity es-
timates increased more with list length in the unique
condition, F (2,34) = 25.01, p < .0001, η2
p
= .595, than




Percentage of correct responses. In the unique condi-
tion of Experiment 1, we did not observe a fixed capacity
limit; instead, estimated capacity increased with set size.
To measure the extent of this increase, we analyzed the
results in terms of the percentage of correct responses.
These results are shown in Figure 2(A) and (B) as a
function of set size and condition. (As mentioned above,
the analyses for the percentage of correct responses are
identical to those for the proportion of items retained,
which we show on the right-hand axis of Figure 2.) Par-
ticipants performed better in the unique condition than
in the repeated condition, and performance decreased
for larger set-sizes. An ANOVA with the within-subject
factor set-size and the between-subjects factor condition
yielded main effects of set-size, F (2,68) = 8.45, p =
.0005, η2
p
= .197, and of condition, F (1,34) = 10.75,
p = .002, η2
p
= .24, but no interaction between these
factors, F (2,68) = .52, p = .595, η2
p
= .0122, ns.
Serial position effects. When presented with the
larger set-sizes of Experment 1, participants might sim-
ply remember the last few items. To address this pos-
sibility, we investigated serial position effects for the
largest set-size, i.e., 17 items. As mentioned above, “old”
items were taken from two initial, medial and final po-
sitions each (while the very first and the very last posi-
tion were never tested). As shown in Figure 2(C), hit
rates increased for later presentation positions, yielding
a recency effect. This was confirmed by an ANOVA
with condition as a between-subjects factor and presen-
tation position as a within-subjects factor, yielding main
effects of presentation position, F (2,68) = 7.68, p =
.001, η2
p
= .180, and of condition, F (1,34) = 7.58, p=
.009, η2
p
= .182, but no interaction between these fac-
tors, F (2,68) = .93, p = .401, η2
p
= .022. Importantly,
hit rates differed from false alarm rates for all presenta-
tion positions (first: t(35) = 8.48, p < .0001, Cohen’s
d = 1.4; middle: t(35) = 8.99, p < .0001, Cohen’s d =
1.5; last: t(35) = 15.42, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 2.6),
suggesting that each serial position contributed to item
memory.
Discussion
The unique condition of Experiment 1 revealed rel-
atively large capacity estimates, doubling between set-
sizes 7 and 17. These results suggest, therefore, that vi-
sual temporary memory capacity might be much larger
than previously thought. In marked contrast, the re-
peated condition revealed capacity estimates in the
range reported in previous WM experiments, suggest-
ing that PI has a substantial negative effect on memory
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A B C
Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1 (A), 2 (B) and 3 (C).The blue solid lines represent the unique conditions, and the red
dotted lines the repeated conditions. Error bars represent SEM. In the unique condition, memory capacity estimates were
relatively large. They were higher, and increased more, than in the repeated condition.
A B C
Figure 2. Detailed results of Experiment 1. Dots represent the means of individual participants, diamonds the sample
averages, and error bars standard errors from the mean. (A,B) Percentage of correct responses and proportion of retained
items in the repeated condition (A) and the unique condition (B). (C) Hit rates for set-size 17 as a function of presentation
positions in the repeated and the unique condition, respectively. False alarm rates are calculated for all “new” trials for
set-size 17.
capacity.
However, these results also show that the data from
the unique condition violate the assumption of the ca-
pacity estimate formula, which is that capacity is fixed
and will not increase once that capacity has been ex-
ceeded. In fact, if participants had a capacity of 8 items
(as the 17-item condition suggests), they should be at
ceiling in the 7-item condition, which was clearly not
the case. Hence, it may be more illuminating to look at
the data in terms of the percentage of correct responses,
as shown in Figure 2. As one can see, the proportion
of correct responses declines somewhat as the number
presented increases, but it is relatively stable, compared
to the same results expressed as capacity. The reason
for the apparent capacity increase is, therefore, that,
according to the formula for estimating the capacity, a
relatively constant number (i.e., the proportion of re-
tained items) is multiplied with a number that grows
(i.e., the number of presented items). Our main finding
is, therefore, that, without massive PI, the proportion of
retained items changes relatively little as a function of
the presented items; as a result, participants can retain
many more items than past capacity estimates suggest,
but they do not seem to have any fixed memory capacity.
We can also exclude that the large capacity estimates
in the unique condition might be due to participants
noticing that only certain serial positions were tested,
and strategically attending to these positions. First,
list length was randomized and different serial positions
were tested for different list lengths, making it impossi-
LARGE CAPACITY TEMPORARY VISUAL MEMORY 7
ble to predict, as a sequence unfolded, when the middle
or end of the sequence would occur. Further, within
each list length, the critical position of the tested item
was randomized. Second, and crucially, if participants
strategically attended to certain serial positions, they
should preferentially encode the items that appear in
serial positions that were tested most regularly. Given
that we probed serial positions 2 and 3 in all list length
conditions, performance for these positions should be
best, leading to a primacy effect. In contrast to this pre-
diction, we observed small but reliable recency effects at
each length of list. Hence, we can exclude the possibility
that participants strategically attended to specific serial
positions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tested the generality of the re-
sults of Experiment 1 by replicating the experiment us-
ing different experimental parameters. Specifically, we
kept a total set of 22 items in the repeated condition, but
used different set-sizes (5, 11, or 21 items). Further, to
test whether the pre-familiarization in Experiment 1 was
required for the contrast between the repeated and the
unique condition, participants were not pre-familiarized
with any pictures.
Materials and methods
Participants. Twenty-four participants (13 females,
means age 25.2) from the MIT community were paid
for taking part in Experiment 2; none had participated
in Experiment 1. They were randomly assigned to the
unique and the repeated condition.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in Ex-
periment 1, with two exceptions. First, we used differ-
ent set-sizes of 5, 11, and 21 items, respectively. Second,
participants were not pre-familiarized with any pictures.
Results
Capacity estimates. As in Experiment 1, we start by
presenting the results of Experiment 2 in terms of esti-
mated memory capacities; while Experiment 1 showed
that the capacity estimates did not conform to the hy-
pothesis that estimated capacity remains constant once
the number of presented items exceeds estimated capac-
ity, one of the objectives of this research was to provide
evidence for this very point. As a result, we present the
results in terms of capacity estimates for Experiment 2
as well.
The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 1(B).
In the unique condition, memory capacity estimates in-
creased from 3.2 to 9.1 between set-sizes 5 and 21. In
contrast, in the repeated condition, capacity estimates
remained close to the range reported in previous WM ex-
periments, increasing from 2.3 to 4.8 between set-sizes
5 and 21. An ANOVA with set-size as within-subject
factor and condition as between-subjects factor yielded
main effects of condition, F (1,22) = 7.50, p = .012,
η2
p
= .254, and of set-size, F (2,44) = 40.78, p < .0001,
η2
p
= .576. Critically, an interaction, F (2,44) = 8.03,
p = .001, η2
p
= .113, indicated that capacity estimates
increased more with set-size in the unique condition,
F (2,22) = 140.6, p < .0001, η2
p
= .927, compared to the
repeated condition, F (2,22) = 4.16, p = .029, η2
p
= .274.
Hence, both in the unique and in the repeated condition,
the results of Experiments 1 and 2 were very similar.
Percentage of correct responses. The results in terms
of the percentage of correct responses and of the pro-
portion of retained items are shown in Figure 3(A) and
(B). Participants performed better in the unique condi-
tion than in the repeated condition, and performance de-
creased for larger set-sizes. An ANOVA with the within-
subject factor set-size and the between-subject factor
condition yielded main effects of set-size, F (2,44) =
34.96, p < .0001, η2
p
= .595, and of condition, F (1,22) =
6.72, p = .017, η2
p
= .234, but no interaction between
these factors, F (2,44) = 1.75, p = .185, η2
p
= .03.
Serial position effects. As in Experiment 1, we inves-
tigated the effect of the presentation position on the
hit rate for the largest set-size (i.e., 21 items). As
shown in Figure 3(C), hit rates increased for later pre-
sentation positions, yielding a recency effect. This was
confirmed by an ANOVA with condition as a between-
subjects factor and presentation position as a within-
subject factor, yielding a main effect of presentation po-
sition, F (2,44) = 11.99, p < .0001, η2
p
= .345, but no
other main effects or interactions. Importantly, how-
ever, hit rates differed from false alarm rates for all pre-
sentation positions (first: t(23) = 5.6, p < .0001, Co-
hen’s d = 1.1; middle: t(23) = 6.77, p < .0001, Cohen’s
d = 1.4; last: t(23) = 10.47, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 2.1),
suggesting that each serial position contributed to the
memory capacity.
Discussion
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that tem-
porary memory for everyday objects does not have the
fixed capacity that past WM experiments seem to sug-
gest, and that participants can temporally retain many
more items than previously thought. As mentioned
above, the capacity estimates in the unique condition
are not meaningful; if participants truly had a fixed ca-
pacity of about 9, they should be at ceiling for all set-
sizes below this limit, which was clearly not the case.
Rather, our crucial result is that, in the unique con-
dition, the proportion of correct responses (equivalent
to the estimated proportion of retained items) changes
only relatively little as a function of the set-size.
In contrast, in the presence of PI, capacity limits re-
mained in the range of WM limitations, although the
capacity estimates for large set-sizes were relatively high
as well. As mentioned earlier, these results are not due
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Figure 3. Detailed results of Experiment 2. Dots represent the means of individual participants, diamonds the sample
averages, and error bars standard errors from the mean. (A,B) Percentage of correct responses and proportion of retained
items in the repeated condition (A) and the unique condition (B). (C) Hit rates for set-size 21 as a function of presentation
positions in the repeated and the unique condition, respectively. False alarm rates are calculated for all “new” trials for
set-size 21.
to verbal memory encoding of the pictures, both because
the presentation rate is too fast for processes such as re-
hearsal, and because linguistic processes are remarkably
independent from those used to memorize the pictures
(Endress & Potter, 2012).
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we further explored the memory ca-
pacity limits in the unique condition. Experiment 3 was
similar to the unique condition of Experiment 2, except
that we used set-sizes of 25, 50 and 100.
Materials and methods
Participants. Twenty participants (12 females, means
age 21.5) from the MIT community took part in Exper-
iment 3; none had participated in the earlier experi-
ments.
Procedure. Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment
2, with four exceptions. First, the experiment contained
only a unique but not repeated condition. Second, we
used the set-sizes 25, 50 and 100. Third, participants
viewed a progress bar between the last sample picture
and the test picture lasting for 1 s.5 Fourth, with 2,400
pictures, we could construct only 12 trials per set-size,
for a total of 36 trials.
Results
Capacity estimates. As in the Experiments above, we
start by presenting the data in terms of capacity esti-
mates. As shown in Figure 1(C), a one-way ANOVA
with set-size as within-subject factor revealed that ca-
pacity estimates increased between set-sizes 25 and 100,
F (2,38) = 5.5, p = .008, η2
p
= .223, reaching a maximum
of 30.0 for set-size 100.
Percentage of correct responses. The results in terms
of the percentage of correct responses and, equivalently
the proportion of retained items are shown in Fig-
ure 4(A). In an ANOVA with the within-subject factor
set-size, the main effect of set-size was not significant,
F (2,38) = 1.2, p = .305, η2
p
= .061, failing to reject the
hypothesis that the percentage of correct responses dif-
fered across set-sizes, and consistent with the hypothesis
that it might be relatively constant irrespective of how
many items are presented.
Serial position effects. As in Experiments 1 and 2,
we investigated the effect of the presentation position
on the hit rate for the largest set-size (i.e., 100 items).
As shown in Figure 4(C), hit rates did not differ statis-
tically across presentation positions, F (2,38) = 1.8, p =
.182, η2
p
= .086, failing to reject the null hypothesis that
the hit rate was the same across serial positions.
Discussion
The unique conditions of Experiments 1 to 3 revealed
large capacity estimates. As pointed out above, the
large capacity estimates do not reflect fixed memory
capacities, but rather indicate that the probability of
recognizing an item changes little as a function of how
many items are presented, at least up to at least 100
5 While the progress bar had no particular function in this
experiment, its purpose in Experiment 4 was to avoid the
impression that the experiment was frozen. It was included
in Experiment 3 as well because we based the Matlab script
for Experiment 3 on that for Experiment 4.
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Figure 4. Detailed results of Experiment 3. Dots represent the means of individual participants, diamonds the sample
averages, and error bars standard errors from the mean. (A) Percentage of correct responses and proportion of retained
items. (B) Hit rates for set-size 100. False alarm rates are calculated for all “new” trials for set-size 100.
items. This raises the question of what kind of memory
system stores the unique items. Plausibly, they might
be stored in long-term memory (LTM). After all, par-
ticipants could, at least in principle, perform their task
by deciding whether or not they have ever seen a test
stimulus before; if they have, it was in the sequence from
the current trial.
At least after consolidation, LTM is relatively stable
over time. For example, in an experiment testing LTM
for the same pictures as those used here, each of 2500
pictures was presented for 3000 ms. Under these condi-
tions, participants’ recognition performance was excel-
lent after 5.5 h (Brady et al., 2008). Hence, if the unique
items that are remembered are stored in a consolidated
form of LTM, we would expect the corresponding mem-
ory to be relatively stable over time.
In contrast, if memory items are stored in a tem-
porary form of memory, the resulting representations
should be fleeting, and should not show the temporal
stability of consolidated LTM representations. That is,
even if the memory representations are fleeting, they
might still be stored in an unconsolidated form of LTM
that might be fleeting. For the current purposes, how-
ever, we just aim to show that the temporary memory
store is indeed temporary, rather than to exclude a con-
tribution from LTM.
In Experiment 4, we explored the temporal stabil-
ity of the memory store. Experiment 4 was similar to
Experiments 1 and 2, with two crucial changes. First,
we introduced variable delays between the end of the
sample sequence and the test item of either 1.5 s (sim-
ilar to Experiments 1 and 2) or 7.5 s. If probe items
that are successfully recognized are stored in a stable
form of memory, there should be no difference between
the two delay conditions. Second, after participants had
completed all the probe trials, they were unexpectedly
tested on their long-term retention of the pictures they
had seen. If memory in the unique condition depends
on a stable form of memory, we should observe recog-
nition performance in the surprise memory test that is
comparable to immediate recognition. Given that the
specific objects participants saw were novel, and that
participants’ long-term ability to remember specific ob-
jects is excellent even when pitted against foils of the
same category (Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010a,
2010b), we would expect little change in the probability
of remembering an item between the immediate tests
and the tests at the end of the experiment about 30
min later, if both depend on a stable form of memory.
Further, Experiment 4 will also rule out a contribution
of sensory or iconic memory (Sperling, 1960), because
iconic memory would not survive a 1.5 s and certainly
not a 7.5 s delay.
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Experiment 4
Materials and methods
Participants. Twenty-four participants (20 females,
means age 23.5) from the MIT community took part in
Experiment 4; none had participated in previous experi-
ments. They were randomly assigned to the unique and
the repeated condition.
Procedure. Experiment 4 was similar to Experiment
2, with three crucial exceptions. First, we used just two
set-sizes, 6 and 17, presented for a total of 192 trials.
Second, we introduced variable delays between the end
of the sample sequence and the test item. As before,
participants started each trial by a key-press, viewed in-
structions to look at the pictures for 1000 ms, followed
by a fixation cross for 300 ms and a 200 ms blank screen,
followed by the sample pictures presented at a duration
of 250 ms per picture. Then, they saw a blank screen
for 200 ms, following by a progress bar of either 1 s or
7 s, followed by a fixation cross for 300 ms, and the test
picture presented for 800 ms. In total, the delay between
the last picture of the sample sequence and the test pic-
ture was 1.5 or 7.5 s (compared to a total delay of 1.7 s in
Experiments 1 and 2). Third, after they had completed
these trials, participants were tested on their long-term
retention of the pictures they had seen. For each pic-
ture, they had to indicate whether or not they had seen
it before in the experiment. Pictures were presented
with the constraint of not having more than three “old”
items or foils in a row. In the unique condition, the 96
“old” pictures tested for long-term retention each came
from one of the 96 trials that had been tested with a new
picture, counterbalanced over set-sizes and three serial
positions (early, middle, or late). The 96 “new” pictures
in the final test were intermixed with the old pictures.
The old pictures were presented in the order in which
they had appeared during the temporary memory part
of the experiment. In the repeated condition, partici-
pants were shown all 22 pictures they had seen, mixed
with 22 foils, presented one at a time. The pictures were
presented in random order. The long-term retention test
started immediately after the RSVP phase of the exper-
iment; as the RSVP phase lasted about 30 min and the
long-term retention test took no more than 5 min (less
in the repeated condition), the LTM retention interval
was between 30 and 35 min.
Results
Capacity estimates. The results of Experiment 4 with
1.5 s and 7.5 s delays are shown in Figure 5(A) and (B).
In the unique condition, capacity estimates increased
from 3.4 to 7.5 between set-sizes 6 and 17 in the short
delay condition, and from 2.2 to 4.9 in the long delay
condition. In the repeated condition, capacity estimates
increased from 2.6 to 6.4 between set-sizes 6 and 17 in
the short delay condition, and from 1.5 to 3.4 in the long
delay condition. An ANOVA with set-size and delay
as within-subject factors and group as between-subjects
factor yielded main effects of delay, F (1,22) = 28.9, p <
.0001, η2
p
= .567, as well as of set-size, F (1,22) = 62.0,
p < .0001, η2
p
= .733. The main effect of group failed to
reach significance, F (1,22) = 2.7, p = .114, η2
p
= .109.
We also observed an interaction between delay and set-
size, F (1,22) = 5.4, p = .03, η2
p
= .195, suggesting the
effect of set-size was more pronounced for short delays,
F (1,22) = 64.2, p < .0001, η2
p
= .744, than for long
delays, F (1,22) = 15.9, p = .0006, η2
p
= .414. There
were no other significant interactions.6
The results of the long-term retention test are shown
in Figure 5(C). In the long-term retention test of the
unique condition, participants performed significantly
but only slightly above chance (M = 53.9%, SD =
4.0%), t(11) = 3.4, p = .006, Cohen’s d = .97, CI.95 =
51.4%, 56.5%. In the repeated condition, participants
were virtually perfect (percentage of correct responses:
6 While the results after the short delay in the unique
condition are reasonably similar to those of the unique con-
dition of Experiment 1, capacity estimates in the repeated
condition seem to increase much more between set-sizes in
the short-delay condition of Experiment 4 than in Exper-
iment 1. (These results cannot be compared statistically,
because the set-sizes differed across the experiments due to
practical considerations.) Hence, the repeated condition in
Experiment 4 does not replicate the findings of the repeated
conditions in Experiments 1 and 2, where the increase in ca-
pacity across set-sizes was relatively limited. A possible ex-
planation for this discrepancy is provided by previous results
showing that increasing the time between trials reduces PI
(Kincaid & Wickens, 1970; Loess & Waugh, 1967; Peterson
& Gentile, 1965). Due to the long-delay condition, inter-
trial intervals in Experiment 4 were on average about 3 s
longer than in Experiments 1 and 2; this, in turn, might
have reduced the PI among items. We addressed this issue
by replicating the repeated condition of Experiment 4 — but
with a short delay on all trials. Results (N=12) showed that
capacity estimates increased from 2.8 for set-size 6 to 5.5
for set-size 17. An ANOVA with set-size as within-subject
factor revealed a main effect, F (1,11) = 35.4, p < .0001,
η2p = .763. Compared to the short-delay condition of the
unique condition of Experiment 4, this control experiment
revealed a main effect of experiment, F (1,22) = 6.2, p <
.021, η2p = .221, and set-size, F (1,22) = 89.3, p < .0001,
η2p = .774, as well as a marginal interaction between set-
size and experiment, F (1,22) = 4.1, p = .054, η2p = .036,
suggesting that the effect of set-size was less pronounced in
this control experiment than for short delays in the unique
condition of Experiment 4. Hence, decreasing the inter-trial
interval increased PI among items, and reestablished the dif-
ference between the unique and the repeated conditions. As
in the repeated condition of Experiment 4, participants were
almost perfect on the long-term retention test (M = 99.4%,
SD = 1.4%), t(11) = 121.2, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 35,
CI.95 = 98.5%, 100.3%.
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Figure 5. Results of Experiment 4. (A) Memory capacity estimates with a 1.5 s interval between the end of the sample
sequence and the test image. (B) Memory capacity estimates with a 7.5 s interval between the end of the sample sequence
and the test image. (C) Retention performance during the surprise memory test at the end of the experiment. The blue solid
lines represent the unique conditions, and the red dotted lines the repeated conditions. Error bars represent SEM.
M = 99.4%, SD = 1.0%), t(11) = 166.6, p < .0001,
Cohen’s d = 48.0, CI.95 = 98.8%, 100.1%.
Percentage of correct responses. The results in terms
of the percentage of correct responses are shown in Fig-
ure 6(A) and (B). Participants performed better after
the short delay than after the long delay, and perfor-
mance decreased for larger set-sizes. An ANOVA with
the within-subject factors set-size and delay, and the
between-subjects factor condition yielded main effects
of set-size, F (1,22) = 12.6, p = .002, η2
p
= 0.355, and de-
lay, F (1,22) = 39.2, p < .0001, η2
p
= .641, but no effect
of condition, F (1,22) = 3.6, p = 0.073, η2
p
= 0.139, ns.
There were no other main effects or interactions.
Serial position effects. As in Experiment 1, we inves-
tigated the effect of the presentation position on the hit
rate for the largest set-size (i.e., 17 items). As shown in
Figure 6(C) and (D), hit rates increased for later pre-
sentation position, yielding a recency effect. This was
confirmed by an ANOVA with condition as a between-
subjects factor, and presentation position and delay as
within-subjects factors. We observed main effects of
presentation position, F (2,44) = 13.75, p < .0001, η2
p
=
0.382, and delay, F (1,22) = 43.48, p < .0001, η2
p
= 0.639,
but not of condition, F (1,22) = 1.26, p = 0.274, η2
p
=
0.054. We observed no other interactions. Importantly,
hit rates differed from false alarm rates for all presenta-
tion positions and delay conditions, suggesting that each
serial position contributed to the memory capacity.
Discussion
Experiment 4 investigated the temporal stability of
the memory mechanism underlying participants’ perfor-
mance in Experiments 1 to 3. In the repeated condi-
tion, long-term retention performance was almost per-
fect. This result is rather unsurprising, given that par-
ticipants saw each item frequently not only in the se-
quences, but also as test items during the first phase
of the experiment and, therefore, for presentation dura-
tions long enough to yield long-term retention.
The unique condition, in contrast, revealed two cru-
cial results. First, long-term retention of the pictures
was almost at chance, suggesting that participants did
not encode items in a stable form of long-term mem-
ory. Second, in the test after each sequence, participants
performed worse after the longer delay, suggesting again
that they did not encode the items they had just seen
in a stable form of memory.7 That being said, given
that forgetting curves tend to be negatively accelerated
(e.g., Jost, 1897; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996; T. D. Wick-
ens, 1998), it is possible that the main forgetting takes
place in the first few seconds; even in this case, however,
a stable LTM representation should not all but disap-
pear in half an hour. In the General Discussion, we will
come back to potential relations between this tempo-
rary memory store and LTM. Specifically, drawing on
recent research casting doubt on a clear dissociation be-
tween short-term memory and LTM (for a review, see
e.g. Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005), we will suggest
7 It should be noted that there is no contradiction between
the results of the unique conditions of Experiments 3 and 4.
While the 100 item sequence in Experiment 3 lasted for 25 s
and, therefore, for more than the 7.5 s delay in Experiment
4, the reduced performance after the 7.5 s delay in Experi-
ment 4 does not imply that no memory for later items in the
100 item sequence should be observed, as forgetting curves
tend to decelerate (e.g., Jost, 1897; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996;
T. D. Wickens, 1998); hence, one would not expect the later
forgetting rates to be as fast as in the first few seconds.
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Figure 6. Detailed results of Experiment 4. Error bars standard errors from the mean. (A,B) Percentage of correct responses
and proportion of retained items after the short delay (A) and the long delay (B). (C,D) Hit rates for set-size 17 as a function
of presentation positions after the short delay (C) and the long delay (D). False alarm rates are calculated for all “new” trials
for set-size 17, separately for the long and the short delay, respectively.
LARGE CAPACITY TEMPORARY VISUAL MEMORY 13
that our large-capacity, temporary memory store reflects
early and unconsolidated LTM traces that decay over
time.
The results so far suggest that we have a temporary
visual memory store for meaningful stimuli with no fixed
storage capacity, and that PI associated with repeated
items can reduce capacity estimates to the typical range
of WM experiments. However, some previous results
using verbal stimuli have found an advantage for lists
of repeated items. Specifically, participants were pre-
sented with a list of words, and had to repeat them
back in order. Performance was better when the words
were sampled from a limited set of items on all trials
compared to when new words were used on all trials
(Coltheart, 1993; Conrad, 1963; Roodenrys & Quinlan,
2000).8 At first sight, these experiments seem to contra-
dict the findings presented here. However, these experi-
ments used words as stimuli, and there is extensive evi-
dence that verbal memory has different properties from
other forms of memory (e.g., Fougnie & Marois, 2006;
Baddeley, 1996, 2003). Phonological encoding permits
words to be rehearsed, and increased familiarity with
words might make it easier to encode them in a phono-
logical format and to rehearse them more efficiently.
To address this issue, we replicated Experiment 2,
but using words as stimuli and, importantly, presenting
them at a rate too fast to permit rehearsal. Experi-
ment 5 was similar to Experiment 2 except that visually
presented words were used as stimuli instead of pictures,
the duration of each word was 120 ms, and participants




Participants. Thirty-two participants (17 females,
means age 24.5) from the MIT community took part
in Experiment 5; none had participated in the previ-
ous experiments. They were randomly assigned to the
unique and the repeated condition.
Materials. We selected 2381 nouns from the CELEX
database (a frequency database for English words) with
the constraints that each noun (i) had between 4 and
10 letters; (ii) had one or two syllables; (iii) had a mini-
mum frequency of 100 of out 17.9 million words; (iv) was
unique in the final list (e.g., words that differed only in
plural markers were removed); (v) was not specific to
British English; (vi) was not a proper noun; (vii) was
not a swear word or otherwise offensive. Words were
presented in a font size of 22 in Courier lower-case font.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Exper-
iment 2, with three exceptions. First, participants
were presented with written words instead of pictures.
Second, as in Experiment 1, participants were pre-
familiarized with the words they would see during the
actual experiment (in the repeated condition), or with
words that would not appear during the actual experi-
ment (in the unique condition). Third, words were pre-
sented at a rate of 120 ms per word. We chose this rate
because pilot testing revealed that participants would
be likely to be at ceiling for slower presentation rates,
and at chance for faster presentation rates.
Results and discussion
Capacity estimates. As in the experiments above, we
start by presenting the data in terms of capacity es-
timates. In the unique condition of Experiment 5, as
shown in Figure 7, capacity estimates increased from 2.6
to 7.6 between set-sizes 5 and 21. In contrast, in the re-
peated condition, capacity estimates increased from 2.2
to 4.8 between set-sizes 5 and 21. An ANOVA with set-
size as within-subject factor and condition as between-
subjects factor yielded main effects of the condition,
F (1,30) = 8.9, p = 0.006, η2
p
= 0.229, as well as of set-
size, F (2,60) = 39.4, p < .0001, η2
p
= 0.538. Critically,
an interaction, F (2,60) = 3.7, p = 0.029, η2
p
= 0.051,
indicated that capacity estimates increased more in the
unique condition, F (2,30) = 39.5, p < .0001, η2
p
= 0.725,
compared to the repeated condition, F (2,30) = 8.68, p =
0.001, η2
p
= 0.367. Hence, irrespective of whether words
or pictures are used as stimuli, humans seem to have
a temporary memory store for meaningful information
with a relatively large capacity, and PI from repeated
items is sufficient to reduce memory capacity to levels
reported in previous WM experiments.
While the main effect of condition was highly sig-
nificant, the interaction between condition and set-size
was only marginally significant (p = .029). To assess
whether the interaction was weaker than in Experiment
2, we performed a joint analysis of Experiments 2 and
5 with set-size as the within-subject factor and condi-
tion and experiment as between-subject factors. We ob-
served main effects of set-size, F (2,104) = 78.88, p <
.0001, η2
p
= 0.553 and condition, F (1,52) = 16.43, p =
0.0002, η2
p
= 0.233, as well as an interaction between
these factors, F (2,104) = 10.0, p = 0.0001, η2
p
= 0.0702,
but no other main effects or interactions. The partici-
pants’ behavior is, therefore, qualitatively the same in
Experiments 2 and 5.9
8 In contrast, memory for just the serial order of a given set
of items is better when items are new on all trials compared
to when they are repeated across trials (Nairne, Whiteman,
& Kelley, 1999).
9 The numerically weaker interaction in Experiment 5 is
presumably due to the fact that performance is numerically
(but not significantly) higher with pictures than with words.
As a result, capacity estimates are bound to increase some-
what less with words as stimuli, reducing the opportunities
to find differences in the slope between the repeated and the
unique condition.
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Figure 8. Detailed results of Experiment 5. Dots represent the means of individual participants, diamonds the sample
averages, and error bars standard errors from the mean. (A,B) Percentage of correct responses and proportion of retained
items in the repeated condition (A) and the unique condition (B). (C) Hit rates for set-size 21 as a function of presentation

































Figure 7. Results of Experiment 5. The blue solid line
represents the unique condition, and the red dotted line the
repeated condition. Error bars represent SEM.
Percentage of correct responses. The results in terms
of the percentage of correct responses and the proportion
of retained items are shown in Figure 8(A) and (B). Par-
ticipants performed better in the unique condition than
in the repeated condition, and performance decreased
for larger set-sizes. An ANOVA with the within-subject
factor set-size and the between-subjects factor condition
yielded main effects of set-size, F (2,60) = 27.7, p <
.0001, η2
p
= 0.471, and of condition, F (1,30) = 8.3, p =
0.007, η2
p
= 0.216, but no interaction between these fac-
tors, F (2,60) = 1.1, p = 0.35, η2
p
= 0.0182, ns.
Serial position effects. As in Experiment 1, we inves-
tigated the effect of the presentation position on the hit
rate for the largest set-size (i.e., 21 items). As shown
in Figure 8(D), hit rates increased for later presentation
position, yielding a recency effect. This was confirmed
by an ANOVA with condition as a between-subjects
factor and presentation position as a within-subjects
factor, yielding a main effect of presentation position,
F (2,60) = 4.1, p = 0.021, η2
p
= 0.114, but no other
main effects or interactions. Importantly, hit rates dif-
fered from false alarm rates for all presentation positions
(first: t(31) = 6.9, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.2; middle:
t(31) = 5.9, p< .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.0; last: t(31) =
7.8, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.4), suggesting that each
serial position contributed to the memory capacity.
General discussion
In the experiments presented here, we start to ad-
dress two conflicting intuitions about the memory ca-
pacity available to cognitive processes. While manyWM
experiments have revealed striking capacity limitations
that correlate with important cognitive abilities, many
other everyday situations seem to call for a much larger
memory for temporary storage.
Participants were shown rapidly presented pictures of
real-world objects or of words. Each item was presented
at most for a duration equivalent to a single eye fixation
(e.g., Rayner, 1998). We asked whether memory capac-
ity would show the severe limitations observed in WM
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experiments, and whether memory capacity limitations
would depend on the presence of proactive interference
(PI) among items. Half of the participants saw each
item only once throughout the experiment; the remain-
ing participants were shown items from a limited set of
22 items, leading to PI among pictures or words. For
the unique group, results of Experiments 1, 2, and 5 re-
vealed large capacity estimates of up to 9.1, and capacity
estimates increased when more items were presented, up
to an average of 30.0 pictures out of 100 in Experiment
3. In other words, when participants were given the op-
portunity to memorize more items, they did so. These
results should not be taken to imply that participants
have an actual capacity of, say, 30 items. As mentioned
above, if they had such a capacity, they should be at
ceiling for all set-sizes below 30, which was clearly not
the case. Rather, these results show that the proportion
of retained items depends only mildly on the set-size.
Even in this case, however, observers can temporarily
store many more items than past capacity limits seem
to suggest.
In contrast, PI clearly limited memory capacity; when
items were reused across trials, capacity estimates were
reduced, remained in the higher range of estimates
reported in previous WM experiments, and increased
much less as a function of the set-size. Further, Ex-
periment 4 showed that participants did not store the
briefly presented items in a temporally stable form of
memory, but rather in a form of memory that began to
decay over the course of a few seconds, and disappeared
almost completely after a few minutes.
Together, these results suggest that temporary stor-
age for meaningful items has a much larger capacity than
in typical WM experiments, and that PI is sufficient to
reduce capacity estimate to the range observed in pre-
vious WM experiments.
Meaningfulness of the items
One reason for the relatively large capacity estimates
we found in the unique condition might have been that
we used meaningful as opposed to meaningless items
or simple visual features. In fact, there is substantial
evidence that prior knowledge allows observers to en-
code more items in WM (see Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez,
2011 for a review and references therein), an observa-
tion that has been made even in the earliest discussions
of memory capacity limitations (Miller, 1956). In fact,
familiarity of items or conceptual information seems to
increase capacity estimates (e.g., Feigenson & Halberda,
2008; Jackson & Raymond, 2008).
However, memory capacity limitations have not only
been observed with meaningless features such as those
used in change-detection experiments following Luck
and Vogel (1997). In fact, the earliest discussion of ca-
pacity limitations involved memory for meaningful stim-
uli such as words (e.g., Miller, 1956; Baddeley, 1996;
see also Cowan, 1995, for a review). Further, working
memory limitations are routinely observed with mean-
ingful non-verbal stimuli such as faces and agents (e.g.,
Curby & Gauthier, 2007; Curby, Glazek, & Gauthier,
2009; Wood, 2008, 2009; Wong, Peterson, & Thompson,
2008). Hence, the large capacity estimates in the unique
condition are not a mere by-product of using meaningful
stimuli as opposed to simple features.
That being said, we would not expect the results from
the unique conditions to hold up for meaningless sim-
ple features such as colors or shapes, for two related
reasons. First, memory for items that are not readily
categorized is known to be extremely poor (Olsson &
Poom, 2005), and there clearly is a limit to how many
meaningless items can be categorized. For example, we
cannot encode thousands of color hues categorically, as
would be required for our experiments. Second, and re-
latedly, given that a large number of meaningless items
is unlikely to be encoded categorically, many of the items
will appear extremely similar to each other, and it is well
known that confusability severely impairs memory per-
formance (e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Conrad, 1963; Conrad
& Hull, 1964; Viswanathan, Perl, Visscher, Kahana, &
Sekuler, 2010).
Hence, while we would not expect our results to hold
up for meaningless items due to how these items are
encoded in the first place, previous reports of work-
ing memory limitations with meaningful stimuli clearly
show that large capacity estimates for temporary mem-
ory are not a mere side effects of using meaningful items
as stimuli.
Previous estimates of WM capacity
While we did not observe an upper bound to how
many items could be temporarily retained, these results
should not be taken to imply that traditional WM mea-
sures are invalid because they are taken from conditions
that promote PI. Indeed, as noted earlier, some authors
have argued that a crucial function of WM is to counter-
act the effects of such interference (Engle, 2002). More-
over, there is evidence that the processes recruited to
counteract interference are active. For example, Kane
and Engle (2000) showed that, while high-span individ-
uals are less prone to PI than low-span individuals, this
difference disappears when participants have to perform
an attentionally demanding secondary task. Further,
measures of WM correlate with important aspects of our
mental lifes, including intelligence, language comprehen-
sion, reasoning, and educational achievement (e.g., Bar-
rouillet, 1996; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman
& Green, 1986; Engle et al., 1999, 1991, 1992; Fukuda
et al., 2010; King & Just, 1991; Kyllonen & Christal,
1990). It thus seems that there are important cogni-
tive situations that require active and effortful manip-
ulation of items, perhaps limiting our ability to juggle
more than three or four items, or even permitting us to
hold no more than a single item in the focus of attention
(e.g., Oberauer, 2002; Oztekin et al., 2010). Crucially,
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however, our results suggest that, in other cognitive sit-
uations, we might not face such stringent memory limi-
tations, and have essentially unbounded capacity avail-
able to temporarily store meaningful information, lim-
ited only by the rate of decay of the items or the in-
evitable interference that even unrelated items exert in
memory.
Relatedly, we do not have a theory of why capacity
estimates in previous experiments often lie between 3
and 4 items; we just refer to previous proposals that
the specific limitations coincide with limitations of vi-
sual attention (see Cowan, 1995, for a review), but our
results do not speak to this issue.
A unitary memory store?
What, then, is the basis for the large-capacity but
temporary memory shown here? At first sight, the re-
sults seem to fit with many models holding that items
in WM are simply the subset of LTM that is currently
active and (mentally) attended (e.g., Cowan, 2005; Con-
way & Engle, 1994; Oberauer, 2002; Oztekin et al.,
2010). For example, in tasks where participants have to
memorize lists of digits, all digits clearly have entries in
LTM, and, within a few trials, all will be activated from
LTM. In such models, WM limitations might arise from
limited-capacity attentional processes that are required
to represent the items on the current list in a form that
shields them from interference from other recently acti-
vated digits (e.g., Cowan, 2005; Conway & Engle, 1994;
Oberauer, 2002; Oztekin et al., 2010). If so, capacity
estimates might become much larger when items do not
need to be attended and rehearsed to avoid PI.
However, there are other considerations suggesting
that our results do not necessarily reflect the same con-
struct as WM. First, WM supposedly relies on active
maintenance, and there is no evidence in our experi-
ments for active maintenance or selective attention to a
subset of items. For example, complex span tasks such
as the sentence span task (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter,
1980), where participants read a sequence of sentences
and have to remember the last word of each, clearly
require active maintenance of the memory items (e.g.,
Kane & Engle, 2000). For other WM tasks, however,
the evidence for active maintenance is less clear. For
example, Fougnie and Marois (2006) asked participants
to memorize an array of colors. Before being tested on
their memory for the colors, they had either to com-
plete a task that is known to tax attention (i.e., to track
multiple objects moving around a display; Pylyshyn &
Storm, 1988; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999), or to memorize
a second array. Memory performance for the first array
was much more impaired by memorizing a second ar-
ray than by a multiple object tracking task, suggesting
that attentional capacity and WM capacity are at least
partially independent. It thus seems fair to conclude
that the evidence for active maintenance is stronger for
some WM tasks than for others, and that it is not clear
whether and where in this spectrum the (presumably)
passive maintenance in our experiments falls.
Second, while the aforementioned models assume that
WM items are also represented in LTM, the results of
Experiment 4 show that the memory items in the unique
condition are not encoded in a temporally stable form
of memory. Indeed, LTM is generally assumed to be
stable over time (see e.g., Brady et al., 2011; Cowan,
2008; Luck, 2007; Sternberg, 2009; see also Craik &
Lockhart, 1972, for a compilation of traditional differ-
ences between long-term memory and short-term mem-
ory), and should not show decay within a few seconds
or minutes. Hence, our results suggest that the mem-
ory items reside in a form of memory that is distinct
from LTM as commonly conceived. Another possibility,
however, is that LTM traces vary in strength and can be
very short-lived. The latter hypothesis is in line with re-
cent studies casting doubt on a clear-cut distinction be-
tween STM and LTM (for a review, see e.g. Ranganath
& Blumenfeld, 2005), and is also consistent with ear-
lier proposals that STM and LTM might be closely re-
lated (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Craik & Lockhart, 1972;
Crowder, 1993; Nairne, 2002; Ranganath & Blumenfeld,
2005; Wickelgren, 1972, 1973), and might show common
forgetting functions (e.g., Rubin & Wenzel, 1996; T. D.
Wickens, 1998; Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991).
For example, some evidence for continuity between
STM and LTM comes from another set of experiments
using a method similar to the unique condition of Exper-
iment 4, in which participants were first tested on their
immediate retention of items presented in a RSVP se-
quence, and subsequently on their long-term retention of
the items they had seen. Crucially, however, some of the
rapidly presented pictures were intermittently repeated
across trials, but were not tested until the end of the
experiment. As in Experiment 4, participants showed
almost no long-term retention for items presented once.
However, memory for the repeated pictures gradually in-
creased as the number of repetitions increased, so that
later long-term recognition performance for a picture
presented just eight times was as good as recognition
performance in the immediate test (Endress & Potter,
under review). These results show that fleeting memo-
ries can be gradually consolidated into stable LTM rep-
resentations, indicating that there is continuity between
STM and LTM.
This being said, presenting an item for a longer time,
or repeating it more often (which, we assume, has similar
effects), is not necessarily sufficient for it to be encoded
in stable long-term memory representations. While, at
least in the short-term domain, presentation duration
clearly has an effect on retention rates (e.g., Intraub,
1980; Keppel & Underwood, 1962; Potter & Levy, 1969;
Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2006), Craik and Watkins
(1973) also showed that time in memory is not the only
determinant of LTM encoding, and that processes like
elaborative rehearsal or directed forgetting also affect
how well or poorly an item is remembered. Be that
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is it might, the experiments reviewed above show that
presenting items more often clearly results in memory
representations that are too stable to be in the STM
domain although a single presentation does not result
in a stable memory representation.
We surmise that memory in the unique condition re-
lies on a short-lived and unconsolidated form of LTM
that functions as a temporary memory store. If so, our
results would be consistent with the following model.
Memory for items viewed briefly is fleeting and disap-
pears over the course of a few minutes, but the capacity
of this temporary memory store is large. Adding proac-
tive interference results in the memory limitations of
previous WM experiments. Finally, if items are viewed
repeatedly or for longer periods of time, the memory rep-
resentations become consolidated in LTM. In addition to
this large capacity temporary memory store, there ap-
pears to be an effortful and severely constrained form of
memory that shows the limitations characteristic of pre-
vious WM experiments, and that relies on active manip-
ulation of memory items. It is presumably this limited-
capacity WM that shows the individual differences in
WM that have been associated with measures of intelli-
gence and life success. How this capacity-limited, active
form of WM works in tandem with the large-capacity
but more passive temporary memory seen in the present
experiment has yet to be explored.
Whatever the case, the present results demonstrate
that meaningful items can be stored in a form of mem-
ory that does not show the temporal stability associated
with LTM and yet has a much larger capacity than past
WM capacity estimates. Some important cognitive ac-
tivities such as logic and mental arithmetic or even just
remembering a phone number might involve the interfer-
ence associated with changing combinations of a small
set of items (e.g., numbers) that limits capacity. How-
ever, this might not be the case for many other everyday
cognitive activities, such as foraging, decision making,
following a conversation, or even understanding a lec-
ture. A memory capacity of three or four items might
well be insufficient in many of these cases, calling for a
form of temporary memory that operates on meaning-
ful items, that does not rely on active maintenance, and
that has a relatively large capacity limit. The present
results suggest that we have just such a form of mem-
ory.
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Appendix
Interference across trials
To examine the effect of proactive interference over
the course of entire experiments, we analyzed the hit
and correct rejection rates as a function of the trial
number in Experiments 1, 2, 4 and 5. (We omitted
Experiment 3 because it did not comprise a repeated
condition.) Specifically, we organized data into bins of
6 trials, separately for each set-size and for “old” and
“new” trials. (We opted for bins of 6 trials because 6
was the smallest divider of the total number of trials
for which the resulting curves looked relatively smooth;
while the results with fewer trials per bin were similar,
they were more noisy.) In Experiment 4, we thus col-
lapsed the data across the two delay conditions.
We collapsed the binned data across set-sizes, and
submitted it to an ANOVA with the proportion of cor-
rect responses as the dependent variable. We included
the condition (unique vs. repeated) as between-subject
predictor and test type (“old” vs. “new”) and bin as
within-subject predictors.
The results for Experiment 1 are shown in Fig-
ure A1(A). (In Experiment 1, we used set-sizes of 7,
12 and 17 items, and prefamiliarized participants with
pictures, in the repeated condition with the pictures
they would experience during the experiment, and in
the unique condition with pictures that would not ap-
pear during the experiment.) We observed main effects
of condition, F (1,34) = 10.75, p = 0.002, η2
p
= 0.24,
and test type, F (1,34) = 6.53, p = 0.015, η2
p
= 0.147,
as well as a marginal interaction between these factors,
F(1,34) = 4.01, p = 0.053, η2
p
= 0.09. There were no
other main effects or interactions. In line with Keppel
and Underwood’s (1962) and D. D. Wickens et al.’s
(1963) finding that PI effects arise extremely quickly,
these results suggest that the pre-familiarization might
have been sufficient to lead to a high level of PI through-
out the experiment.
In Experiment 2, we used set-sizes of 5, 11 and 21,
but no pre-familiarization. The results of the by-bin
analyses are shown in Figure A1(B). The data were an-
alyzed as for Experiment 1. We observed main effects
of condition, F (1,22) = 6.72, p = 0.017, η2
p
= 0.234,
and test type, F (1,22) = 5.28, p = 0.031, η2
p
= 0.193.
Critically, we also observed an interaction between test
type and bin, F (4,88) = 2.88, p = 0.027, η2
p
= 0.104, as
well as a triple interaction between condition, test type
and bin, F (4,88) = 2.81, p = 0.030, η2
p
= 0.10.
We follow up on these interactions by separately an-
alyzing the unique and the repeated condition. For the
unique condition, we observed a non-significant main ef-
fect of test type, F (1,11) = 3.60, p = 0.084, η2
p
= 0.247,
ns, and no other main effects or interactions. For the
repeated condition, we observed an interaction between
test type and bin, F (4,44) = 5.62, p = 0.001, η2
p
= 0.338.
For “new” items, there was no significant effect of bin,
F (4,44) = 1.75, p = 0.157, η2
p
= 0.137, ns. In contrast,
for “old” items, performance decreased as a function of
the bin number, F (4,44) = 4.11, p = 0.006, η2
p
= 0.272.
In Experiment 4, we presented participants with dif-
ferent retention delays, but collapsed the analyses below
across delays. The ANOVA revealed only a marginal ef-
fect of condition, F (1,22) = 3.55, p = 0.073, η2
p
= 0.139,
a main effect of test type, F (1,22) = 31.05, p = .00001,
η2
p
= 0.557, and marginal interactions between test type
and bin, F (3,66) = 2.57, p = 0.062, η2
p
= 0.095, and
between condition, test type and bin, F (3,66) = 2.55,
p = 0.063, η2
p
= 0.094. Hence, as in the analyses of Ex-
periment 4 reported above, the results of Experiment 4
are somewhat weak, presumably due to the inclusion of
the long test delay.
In Experiment 5, we tested participants’ memory for
words after pre-familiarization with the words. The re-
sults are shown in Figure A1(D). We observed only main
effects of condition, F (1,30) = 8.27, p = 0.007, η2
p
=
0.216, and of test type, F (1,30) = 33.37, p = .00001,
η2
p
= 0.518, but no other main effects or interaction.
Hence, we did not have sufficient temporal resolution to
detect the build-up of PI over the course of the experi-
ment.
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Figure A1. Results of Experiment 1, 2, 4 and 5 as a function of the trial number. Trials were organized into bins of 6 trials,
separately for each set-size and for “old” and “new” trials.
